Introduction
After the collapse of the communist bloc in 1989, countries in Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland, started a rapid political and economic transformation. In the course of this process, Poland substantially narrowed the development gap against wealthier economies of Western Europe (see, e.g. Balcerowicz et al., 2013) . However, differences in economic performance between particular regions within Poland have been a persistent feature of Polish transition (see, e.g. Ciżkowicz et al., 2014) . As soon as 1994, Polish government implemented special economic zones (hereafter: SSEs -pol. Specjalne Strefy Ekonomiczne 1 ) as a place-based policy aimed at mitigating these differences by inter alia attracting investment and creating new jobs. Increasing reliance on SSEs has been mirrored in both the gradual expansion of SSEs' territory and the extensions of their operating time horizon
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. Support for enterprises operating in SSEs involves substantial fiscal costs 3 , so the problem of SSEs' effectiveness as a policy tool becomes vital. The problem may be divided into two questions:
 firstly, what explains considerable differences in first round effects, i.e. why some SSEs attract more firms than the others;
 secondly, what is the impact of firms located in SSEs on economic outcomes outside SSEs territory.
Our research seeks to answer the second question 4 . The authors estimate a set of panel and spatial panel data models of employment and capital outlays for 379 Polish poviats (eng. counties; LAU-1, previously NUTS-4 regions) over the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . To assess the impact of SSEs we include employment and investment of SSE-based firms in the set of explanatory variables in the models.
We apply an approach proposed by LeSage and Pace (2009) in order to correctly interpret spatial effects resulting from the estimates.
Our main findings are as follows:
1 In the remainder of this paper we use acronyms "SSEs" to indicate the Polish special economic zones created by the Act of 1994, and "SEZ" to indicate the broader set of geographically-targeted investment incentive schemes in general.
2 In 2013, SSEs operations were extended until 2026. 3 Until the beginning of 2012, the value of public aid extended to companies operating in the SSEs amounted to PLN 10.5 bn. On top of that expenditures on infrastructure development and marketing were close to PLN 3.0 bn (Ministry of Economy, 2013) . 4 In Ciżkowicz et al. (2015) we seek to address the first part of the question.
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Firstly, SSEs have substantial positive effect on employment. Every 100 jobs in a given SSE create, on average, about 72 jobs outside the SSE in hosting county and 137 jobs in neighbouring counties.
Secondly, effect of SSEs on investments is weaker, but still positive. Investments in a given SSE do not crowd in investments outside the SSE, but do not crowd them out either. Thereby, investments in SSEs add one to one to capital stock in hosting counties. The findings are robust to changes in estimation methods, sample composition, set of explanatory variables and spatial weight matrix.
The paper makes three main contributions to the literature on the topic.
Firstly, while SSEs in Poland have been functioning for over 20 years, a precise, robust and comprehensive analysis of SSEs impact on regional economic outcomes is still lacking 5 . We seek to fill this gap using a unique firm-level dataset for Polish SSEs, which to our best knowledge has not been exploited by other researchers. The scope of the dataset encompasses all companies operating in SSEs between 2003 and 2012 and amounts to about 30,000 observations. The dataset contains information about individual companies' investments outlays, retained and newly created jobs and the sectors in which particular firms operate. We combined the information with regional data from the Central Statistical Office describing various characteristics of counties in which SSEs are located. The dataset allows to expand the analysis beyond the -typically studied in the literaturedirect employment and investment creation that takes place on the SSEs territories and to account not only for the cross-sectional, but also dynamic and spatial effects of SSEs' functioning.
Secondly, the vast majority of the empirical research is based on dummy variable indicating zone existence in a particular region and time period. The variable is incorporated into (cross-section or panel data) standard model of regions' GDP, employment or investment and the estimates are interpreted as the average impact of SEZ on economic outcomes of a hosting region. Instead, we use measures of first round effects of SSEs functioning -the level of employment and capital outlays by the companies operating in SSE in particular county and time period. This approach, which to our best knowledge has not been used previously in the literature, enables us to avoid some principal limitations of dummy variable approach. Firstly, we are able to distinguish between first round effects of SSE's creation (i.e. scale of activity of firms located on the SSEs' territory) from induced effects (i.e. the impact of companies located in the SSE's territory on economic outcomes of firms located in the hosting region, but outside this territory). Based on this Introduction 5 decomposition, important conclusions might be drawn with regard to the existence of crowdingin/crowding-out effects and spillovers from SSEs functioning. This type of reasoning, which is the core of our analysis, is not possible with the use of dummy variable. Secondly, dummy variable approach assumes that all SSEs are homogenous, while in fact they differ with respect to the scale of financial incentives, quality of infrastructure, available area, etc. This heterogeneity results in considerable differences (both in time and cross-section dimension) with respect to the number, scale and characteristics of firms located in SSEs territories. Dummy variable approach averages out these differences, which may result in biased estimates of SSEs' impact on economic outcomes of hosting region. Our approach, on the contrary, fully exploits these differences. Thirdly, using SSE-based employment and investment as explanatory variables allows us to estimate models with fixed effects which capture unique characteristics of particular regions. In the dummy variable approach fixed effects are indistinguishable from the effects of SSE functioning.
Thirdly, we use spatial panel data models. They allow us to distinguish three types of induced effects of SSE on employment and investments: effects outside SSE in hosting counties, externalities to neighbouring counties and feedback loop effects from neighbouring counties to SSE-hosting counties. To our best knowledge those effects have not been analysed so far in any research on SSEs and SEZs in general. However, accounting for them is necessary for correct costbenefits analysis of SEZs. As demonstrated by LeSage and Pace (2009) ignoring these effects may result in bias and inconsistency of the estimator due to omitted variable problem.
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents main conclusions from hitherto literature. Section 3 presents main features of SSEs giving special attention to the financial and non-financial incentives provided by SSE to prospective investors as well as the territorial and institutional evolution of the scheme. Section 4 includes a presentation of the dataset followed by a brief overview of main stylized facts related to SSEs functioning in Poland. Section 5 presents analytical framework of the study indicating main channels through which SSE can influence employment and investments as well as estimation strategy including comparison with strategies used in most other studies on the topic. Section 6 presents results of econometric modelling and elaborates on their economic implications and policy conclusions. Section 7 verifies the results'
robustness. Section 8 concludes.
Related literature
Majority of theoretical literature confirms positive first round effects of SEZs (or tax incentives in general) on employment and investment (see, e.g. House and Shapiro, 2006; Edge and Rudd, 2010) .
However, the theoretical literature on their possible externalities is much less conclusive (see, e.g. Findlay, 1978; Wang, 1992, Rodriguez-Clare, 1996; Glass and Saggi, 1998; Markusen and Venables, 1997; Johansson and Nilsson, 1997; Liu, 2008; Lin and Saggi, 2005 and Ge, 2012) . It points out that the attraction to a given region of new companies that use more advanced technology or possess superior know-how (as in the case of most FDIs) than the ones present in that region can spur employment and investment in that region. However, in certain cases, some less competitive companies might be driven out of their markets or crowded-out (never be formed) by those new companies.
The empirical studies on SEZs' effects can be grouped according to the methodological approach they use. The first group of research includes descriptive case studies concerning the evolution of particular SEZs. This strand of literature gives special attention to the first round effects of SEZs.
The studies belonging to the second group are based on formal econometric analyses. They usually make use of dummy variable or conceptually similar methods (e.g. difference-in-differences estimators) to evaluate the differences between SEZ-hosting and non-hosting regions. However, these studies most often do not differentiate between first round and induced effects of SEZs.
A large part of the literature on Polish SSEs belongs to the first group and focuses on descriptive analyses based on case studies, evaluating the efficiency of SSEs in attracting new investment (in particular foreign direct investments (FDI)) without formal quantitative verification of the findings.
The main conclusion drawn from this research is that SSEs increase the employment and investments (e.g. Kryńska, 2000; Kozaczka, 2008; Zasępa, 2010; Rydz, 2003; Smoleń, 2010; Gwozdz and Kwiecińska, 2005; Byczkowska and Kaczmarek, 2010) . However, these studies do not isolate the impact of SSE creation from the impact of exogenous economic conditions in the analysed regions. Moreover, although some authors indicate that the effects of SSEs vary across zones, they do not identify the factors behind these differences (e.g. Cieślewicz, 2009) or only list potential factors but do not analyse them quantitatively (e.g. Godelwska-Majkowska and Typa, 2008; Pilarska, 2009; Jarczewski, 2006; Smętkowski, 2002; Trojak and Wiedermann, 2009) .
A notable exception on that score is the study by Jensen and Winiarczyk (2014) who estimate the regional economic impact of SSEs with the use of panel data models based on dummy variable approach.
Most empirical studies on SEZs in other countries, in particular in the US, France and the UK, belong to the second group. Their results are hardly conclusive, irrespective of the country under study. Estimated effects range from positive (see, e.g. Criscuolo et al., 2007; Devereux et al., 2007; Givord et al., 2011; Givord et al., 2012 or Mayer et al., 2013 , neutral (see, e.g. Gobillion, 2012 or Neumark and Kolko, 2008) to even negative (see, e.g. Billings, 2009) . The predominant view is that they are positive albeit weak (see the literature review by, e.g. Hirasuna and Michael, 2005) . Some authors suggest that the strength of SEZ functioning effects depends on both pre-existing regional economic conditions (e.g. Goss and Phillips, 2001; Mayneris and Py, 2013) , as well as particular features of the zones (Bondonio, 2003) .
The research on potential externalities from FDI, predominant type of SEZs investment, is similarly inconclusive. Some empirical studies point to positive externalities (e.g. Haskel et al., 2002; Gorg and Strobl, 2001) , while others identify negative spillovers (e.g. Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Djankov and Hoekmann, 2000) and still others find no spillovers at all (e.g. Kokko et al., 1996) .
The meta-analysis by Gorg and Strobl (2001) suggests that the differences in the results obtained may be partly of a methodological background. Other authors indicate that the strength of positive externalities may depend on many variables such as the level of human capital in the region (Borensztein et al. 1998) , the technology gap between domestic and foreign companies (Havranek and Irsova, 2011) or the competitiveness of local market (Blomstrom et al., 2000) .
The ambiguity of empirical results points to the need of thorough analysis of channels through which SEZs influence regional economic performance. In particular, until now the first round and induced effects of SEZs have not been comprehensively analysed in separation. While the existence of positive first round effects of SEZs is not debated, the occurrence and sign of induced effects may depend on pre-existing conditions in the regions where SEZs are located. Ignoring these effects can lead to biased estimates of benefits from SEZs.
Special economic zones in Poland as a regional development policy tool
SEZ in Poland can be classified into three separate groups: (i) Specjalne Strefy Ekonomiczne, (ii) industrial and technological parks, (iii) duty-free zones and duty-free warehouses 6 . Only the first group (SSEs) is the subject of the following analysis.
Specjalne Strefy Ekonomiczne (SSEs) are defined as administratively separated areas where investors are granted preferential conditions. SSEs are aimed at accelerating the development of selected parts of Poland primarily by creating new jobs, developing technologies, enhancing the competitiveness of produced goods and promoting exports. The main incentive offered by SSEs is income tax exemption on income earned from the business activity conducted within SSE, granted under condition of continuing operations and retaining employment for at least 5 years. Moreover, when applying for SSE designation or for a SSE-designated plot, companies declare the number of new jobs they plan to create and investment outlays they intend to realise. If the declarations are not met, the company might lose the SSE designation and be forced to return the financial aid granted.
The level of tax exemption is determined by the amount of eligible costs (the qualified cost of a new investment or value of labour costs of new employees incurred over a 2-year-horizon) and so called maximum intensity of regional aid (amounting from 15% to 50% depending on the zone).
Additionally, investors planning to locate in SSE are offered fully-equipped plots on preferential conditions and in some cases -depending on the decision of community (NUTS-5 aggregation level) -real estate tax exemptions.
SSEs as a policy tool underwent a major evolution over its lifespan. The evolution pertained to every aspect of SSEs functioning, including the territorial span of the scheme as well as size and conditionality of financial aid granted to SSE-based companies. Table 1 summarizes this evolution.
6 Industrial parks are groups of separated real estates with technical infrastructure left after the restructuring or liquidation of an enterprise that enables the conduct of business operations, especially for SMEs. In turn, a technology park is a separated group of real estates with technical infrastructure created to stimulate the flow of knowledge and technology between science institutions and enterprises. The areas of industrial and technological parks are small compared to those of SSEs. In fact, some of the parks lay within the boundaries of SSEs, making additional tax incentives available for the park investors. Duty-free zones and duty-free warehouses are separated areas of Polish customs territory in which, regarding import duties and trade policy instruments, imported goods are considered to be outside the customs territory of Poland. They are created in order to facilitate the international transit of goods, especially in seaports, airports and areas adjacent to border crossings. previously extended and non-utilised SSE designation need to be revoked. *** Table 1 here *** 7 SSE designation can be extended to both empty industrial plots and to land already used for industrial purposes (on application by a functioning company). In the former case, the SSE-designated land can be subsequently developed by an investor. In the latter, an existing plant of an applying company is included into SSE territory. This can be done only if the company seeking SSE designation meets all the relevant criteria (e.g. employment retention and creation). previously extended and non-utilised SSE designation need to be revoked. *** Table 1 here *** 7 SSE designation can be extended to both empty industrial plots and to land already used for industrial purposes (on application by a functioning company). In the former case, the SSE-designated land can be subsequently developed by an investor. In the latter, an existing plant of an applying company is included into SSE territory. This can be done only if the company seeking SSE designation meets all the relevant criteria (e.g. employment retention and creation).
Data and stylized facts
The data we use come from two main sources: 
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1% by high-tech companies (see Table 2 ). However, there are large differences between technology intensity profiles of particular regional groupings of SSEs (groups of SSEs managed by separate administrators). Jastrzębie-Zdrój saw a reduction in employment (see Table 3 ). Interestingly, the differences in economic performance during that period between Jastrzębie-Zdrój and Żory were not simple reflection of the differences in the SSEs' development.
***
*** Table 3 here *** (vii) However, counties hosting SSE seem to have outperformed in economic terms counties in which SSE has never existed. In 2003, when most of the SSE were still in their infancy, the former counties did not differ substantially in terms of economic performance from the latter counties (see Table 4 ). In particular, both groups of counties had similar unemployment (inclusive of long term unemployment) and labour participation rates. By contrast, in 2012 they differed on that score. Table 5 indicate bles are stationary or trend-stationary.
*** Table 6 here*** ith the analysis of employment models i.e. Model 1, 3, and 5.
om the Model 1 (see columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 ) that channel B contributes to an employment in SSE hosting counties. Estimates of amounts to 1.860 and are higher than 1 for both ).
*** Table 7 here*** step we estimate Model 3 (see columns (3) and (4) of 
12
***
*** Table 3 here *** (vii) However, counties hosting SSE seem to have outperformed in economic terms counties in which SSE has never existed. In 2003, when most of the SSE were still in their infancy, the former counties did not differ substantially in terms of economic performance from the latter counties (see Table 4 ). In particular, both groups of counties had similar unemployment (inclusive of long term unemployment) and labour participation rates. By contrast, in 2012 they differed on that score. is not available. The macroeconomic regional data described above cover the whole period for which SSE-based company-level data are available, in the same, i.e. annual, intervals.
The initial data inspection leads to drawing the following stylized facts:
The SSE designation is an appealing investment incentive both for the authorities and is not available. The macroeconomic regional data described above cover the whole period for which SSE-based company-level data are available, in the same, i.e. annual, intervals.
The SSE designation is an appealing investment incentive both for the authorities and Jastrzębie-Zdrój saw a reduction in employment (see Table 3 ). Interestingly, the differences in economic performance during that period between Jastrzębie-Zdrój and Żory were not simple reflection of the differences in the SSEs' development.
*** Table 3 here *** (vii) However, counties hosting SSE seem to have outperformed in economic terms counties in which SSE has never existed. In 2003, when most of the SSE were still in their infancy, the former counties did not differ substantially in terms of economic performance from the latter counties (see Table 4 ). In particular, both groups of counties had similar unemployment (inclusive of long term unemployment) and labour participation rates. By contrast, in 2012 they differed on that score. Jastrzębie-Zdrój saw a reduction in employment (see Table 3 ). Interestingly, the differences in economic performance during that period between Jastrzębie-Zdrój and Żory were not simple reflection of the differences in the SSEs' development.
*** Table 3 here *** (vii) However, counties hosting SSE seem to have outperformed in economic terms counties in which SSE has never existed. In 2003, when most of the SSE were still in their infancy, the former counties did not differ substantially in terms of economic performance from the latter counties (see Table 4 ). In particular, both groups of counties had similar unemployment (inclusive of long term unemployment) and labour participation rates. By contrast, in 2012 they differed on that score. *** Table 4 here ***
Analytical framework and estimation strategy
The mechanism through which SEZs influence regional economic performance can be decomposed into four channels (see Figure 1 ):
A. First round effects 9 : the impact of SEZ incentives on companies' decisions to invest and create or retain employment in the SEZ designated territory;
B. Induced effects: the effects induced by the functioning of SEZ-based companies in a delimited (geographically or administratively) region of SEZ location, but outside the SEZ territory itself.
These effects can be attributed to a number of economic processes, which can give rise to both positive and negative impact on the overall economic performance of the region. On the one hand, the induced effects can include clustering of similar companies and vertical integration 
These effects can be attributed to a number of economic processes, which can give rise to both positive and negative impact on the overall economic performance of the region. On the one hand, the induced effects can include clustering of similar companies and vertical integration some principal limitations of dummy variable approach. Firstly, we are able to distinguish between first round (channel A) and induced (channel B) effects. This is not possible with the use of dummy variable. Secondly, dummy variable approach assumes that all SSEs are homogenous, while in fact they differ with respect to the scale of financial incentives, quality of infrastructure, available area etc. This results in considerable differences (both in time and cross-section dimension) in the number, scale and characteristics of firms located in their territory. Dummy variable approach averages out these differences, which may result in biased estimates of SSEs' impact on economic outcomes of hosting county. Our approach, on the contrary, fully exploits these differences. Thirdly, using SSE-based employment and investment as explanatory variables allows us to estimate models with fixed effects which capture unique characteristics of particular counties. In the dummy variable approach fixed effects are indistinguishable from the effects of SSE functioning.
14 some principal limitations of dummy variable approach. Firstly, we are able to distinguish between first round (channel A) and induced (channel B) effects. This is not possible with the use of dummy variable. Secondly, dummy variable approach assumes that all SSEs are homogenous, while in fact they differ with respect to the scale of financial incentives, quality of infrastructure, available area etc. This results in considerable differences (both in time and cross-section dimension) in the number, scale and characteristics of firms located in their territory. Dummy variable approach averages out these differences, which may result in biased estimates of SSEs' impact on economic outcomes of hosting county. Our approach, on the contrary, fully exploits these differences. Thirdly, using SSE-based employment and investment as explanatory variables allows us to estimate models with fixed effects which capture unique characteristics of particular counties. In the dummy variable approach fixed effects are indistinguishable from the effects of SSE functioning.
We analyse the impact of firms located in SSEs on two different measures of counties economic activity: total (including SSE-located companies) employment ( and total investment 
( 2) where emp_sse it and cap_sse it describe activity of firms located in SSE (respectively, total employment and investment) in i-th county in year t; and are sets of control variables which determine, respectively, employment and investment in i-th county in year t but are not directly related to SSE functioning ; are structural parameters; and are fixed effects, which capture unique characteristics of i-th county; and are IID error terms.
Variables in vectors and are either standard determinants of regional employment and investment or the indicators capturing differences between SSE hosting and non-hosting counties identified in preliminary data inspection (see Table 4 ). In particular, vector consists of variables 10 It would be interesting to examine the impact of firms operating in SSEs on GDP, however the measure of output is not available at the county territorial disaggregation level. 11 Detailed description of variables is presented in Table 5. 14 some principal limitations of dummy variable approach. Firstly, we are able to distinguish between first round (channel A) and induced (channel B) effects. This is not possible with the use of dummy variable. Secondly, dummy variable approach assumes that all SSEs are homogenous, while in fact they differ with respect to the scale of financial incentives, quality of infrastructure, available area etc. This results in considerable differences (both in time and cross-section dimension) in the number, scale and characteristics of firms located in their territory. Dummy variable approach averages out these differences, which may result in biased estimates of SSEs' impact on economic outcomes of hosting county. Our approach, on the contrary, fully exploits these differences. Thirdly, using SSE-based employment and investment as explanatory variables allows us to estimate models with fixed effects which capture unique characteristics of particular counties. In the dummy variable approach fixed effects are indistinguishable from the effects of SSE functioning.
Variables in vectors and are either standard determinants of regional employment and investment or the indicators capturing differences between SSE hosting and non-hosting counties identified in preliminary data inspection (see Table 4 ). In particular, vector consists of variables 10 It would be interesting to examine the impact of firms operating in SSEs on GDP, however the measure of output is not available at the county territorial disaggregation level. 11 Detailed description of variables is presented in Table 5 .
describing counties demographic structure (share of working age population in total populationwork_age it , share of individuals aged18-24 and share of individuals aged 55-59/64 12 in working age population -young it and old it , respectively) and corporate sector characteristics (number of registered companies -firms it , manufacturing production per inhabitant -ind_prod it and investments of firms located outside SSE -cap_non_sse it ). Vector contains variables characterizing county's economy (share of population living in rural area in total county's population -rur_pop it ), corporate sector (ind_prod it and firms it ) and labor market (employment outside SSEemp_non_sse it ).
Estimates of and based on Model 1 and Model 2, respectively, allow to examine induced effects of SSE functioning described by channel B (see Figure 2 ) and should be interpreted as follows:
 -SSE generates crowding-out effects in the hosting county replacing to some extent employment (investment) outside SSE with employment (investment) in SSE; if estimates of the parameter is not significantly different from zero than full crowding out takes place i.e. SSE employment (investment) is generated at the expense of employment (investment) in the hosting county outside SSE territory -the net effect of SSE designation for the hosting region is null;  -SSE creates employment (attracts investment) to the hosting counties, but it does not have any additional impact (neither positive nor negative) on employment (investment) of companies located in this county but outside SSE territory;  -SSE generates crowding-in effects in the hosting county which means activity of firms located in SSE exerts positive impact on employment (investment) of firms located in this county but outside SSE.
Models 1 and 2 allow to examine induced effects of channel B but ignores possible impact of channel C and channel D which is equivalent to the assumption that the spatial effects of SSEs functioning are restricted only to the hosting counties. This assumption seems very restrictive and counterintuitive: for example, firms located in SSEs may hire employees from neighboring counties and clustering or vertical integration of firms may spur investments in those counties. As indicated 12 The upper age limit in this respect is different for men (64) and women (59).
by LeSage and Fischer (2008) , ignoring spatial dependence of this type may result in biased and inconsistent estimates due to omitted variable problem 13 .
In order to take into account the above considerations we estimate panel Spatial Durbin Models (hereafter: SDM) of the form:
where W is an weight matrix 14 , and are spatial autoregressive coefficient of spatial lags of dependent variables ( and , respectively) and and are coefficients of spatial lags and .
In Models 3 and 4 we assume that the only explanatory variable with spatial lag is emp_sse it and cap_sse it , respectively. If the assumption is not correct, than estimates of parameters and may be biased due to omitted spatial dependence between, respectively, variables in vectors and emp it or and cap it . In order to control for this issue in Models 5 and 6 the set of spatially lagged variables has been broadened with vectors and :
where vectors and are vectors containing coefficients of spatial lags and .
There are at least three important methodological aspects of Models 3-6 which should be considered.
The first is the validity of SDM specification over many other spatial models developed in theoretical literature. We choose SDM for at least two reasons. gives unbiased coefficient estimates also if the true data-generation process is SEM (see e.g. Elhorst, 2010) . That being said, we check validity of SDM over SEM testing following hypothesis: Rejection of particular hypothesis means that SDM specification properly describes the data. On the contrary, if the hypothesis is not rejected than the spatial dependence is due to spatially autocorrelated error term.
The second issue is the choice of weight matrix structure. We construct W as inverse distance matrix based on geographic distance between centroids of every pair of counties. The matrix has been row-normalized so that the sum of all elements in each row equals 1. We imposed a cut-off distance of 80 km beyond which weights are assumed to be zero. It creates sparse connectivity structure which according to LeSage (2014) is suitable for empirical purposes. Since the average area of a county equals about 1000 km 2 the assumed cut-off distance is equivalent to assuming that firms located in SSE in one county exert impact on employment and investment of first and second-order neighbouring counties. Creating weight matrix based on rather ad hoc assumptions may seem unjustified, however as indicated by LeSage and Pace (2014) it is a common mistake to believe that the estimates of spatial regression model depend strongly on the weight matrix specification 15
.That said, in Section 7 we check the robustness of results to changes in distance cutoff level as well as the way the distance between counties is measured.
The third issue concerns valid interpretation of estimates from SDM. As indicated by LeSage and
Pace (2009) 15 The authors show that this view is a byproduct of incorrect interpretation of estimates from spatial regression models.
and calculate three scalar summary measures for the estimates' interpretation:
 direct impact which is the average of diagonal elements of matrices (7) or (8)  indirect impact which is the average of the off-diagonal elements of matrices (7) or (8); it measures the cumulated change in employment or capital outlays outside SSE hosting county due to the change in, respectively, employment or investment of firms located in SSE hosted by this county; indirect impact measures spatially induced effects of SSE activity described in channel C; positive and statistically significant value of the indirect impact indicates that the effects of SSE activity are not restricted to hosting county, but spill over to neighbouring counties; on the contrary, negative and significant estimates indicate that SSEs crowd-out employment or investment from neighbouring counties;
 total impact which is the sum of direct and indirect impact; it measures the aggregated impact of SSE functioning exerted through channels B, C and D.
We estimate Models 1-6 using two estimators. We begin with fixed effects (FE), which assumes homogeneous coefficients of the explanatory variables, but allow for a different constant term for particular counties. The results may be biased due to several methodological problems. The first one is a possible cross-section dependence of error terms. In the analyzed model, this is equivalent to the assumption that there are unobserved time-varying omitted variables common for all counties, which impact individual counties differently. If these unobservable common factors are uncorrelated with the independent variables, the coefficient estimates based on FE are consistent, but standard errors estimates are biased. Therefore, we use the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) nonparametric covariance matrix estimator (DK) which corrects for the error structure spatial dependence 16 . This estimator also addresses the second problem, namely standard errors bias due to potential heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the error terms. The third problem is endogeneity due to potential correlation between the regressors and the error term. It is alleviated to some extent by using a wide range of control variables however it may not be fully eliminated. One of the possible solutions is to use the instrumental variables estimator. This estimator is asymptotically consistent yet it may be severely biased when applied to such short samples as ours. In Section 7 we assess the severity of the endogeneity problem through modifications to our base regressions i.e.
restricting the sample to counties with SSE and enhancing the set of control variables.
Taking into account all of the above restrictions, we use fixed effects (FE) and Driscoll-Kraay (DK) to estimate Models 1-6. That said, we are fully aware that our results ought to be treated with caution -at the very least due to estimation problems typical for panel datasets with as short time dimension as in our sample. 16 It should be stressed that this type of spatial dependence may be also present in Models 3-6 even if the hypothesis that SEM is the true data-generation process has been rejected. Note that in the SEM specification the error term structure is of the form , while in DK estimator it is where .
Estimation results and implications
Having time dimension in the data set, one should start with examination of variables' stationarity.
We use Maddala and Wu (1999) and Pesaran (2007) test 17 . Results presented in Table 5 indicate that all variables are stationary or trend-stationary.
*** Table 6 here***
We begin with the analysis of employment models i.e. Model 1, 3, and 5.
It follows from the Model 1 (see columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 ) that channel B contributes to an increase in employment in SSE hosting counties. Estimates of amounts to 1.860 and are significantly higher than 1 for both ).
*** Table 7 here***
In the next step we estimate Model 3 (see columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 (1), (4) and (2), (5) 17 We are aware that the results of both tests may be biased. Maddala and Wu test assumes lack of cross-section dependence, which is actually the case for all analysed variables but is most suitable for short and fixed time dimension as in our sample. On the other hand, Pesaran test assumes cross-section dependence but T tending to infinity. Unfortunately, to our best knowledge no test addresses both of the shortcomings simultaneously.
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In the next step we estimate Model 3 (see columns (3) and (4) of 17 We are aware that the results of both tests may be biased. Maddala and Wu test assumes lack of cross-section dependence, which is actually the case for all analysed variables but is most suitable for short and fixed time dimension as in our sample. On the other hand, Pesaran test assumes cross-section dependence but T tending to infinity. Unfortunately, to our best knowledge no test addresses both of the shortcomings simultaneously.
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Estimation results and implications
negligible. In turn the estimates of indirect impact of emp_sse it variable are significant both statistically (z-test p-value<0.01) and economically. They amount between 1.368 (for FE) and 1.528
(for DK) indicating that an increase in SSE-based employment in a given county substantially increases the employment in neighbouring counties through spatially induced effects (channel C).
The estimates of direct and indirect impact suggest that every 100 jobs in a given SSE create, on average, about 72 jobs outside the SSE in hosting county and 137 jobs in neighbouring counties.
The scale of these effects may seem surprising but as argued by LeSage and Fischer (2008) 
In the next step we estimate Model 3 (see columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 (1), (4) and (2), (5) (for DK) indicating that an increase in SSE-based employment in a given county substantially increases the employment in neighbouring counties through spatially induced effects (channel C).
The scale of these effects may seem surprising but as argued by LeSage and Fischer (2008) (5) and (6) of Table 7 and (7) - (12) of Then, we analyze investments models i.e. Model 2, 4, and 6.
Estimates from the Model 2 (see columns (7) and (8) In turn, estimates from the Model 4 indicate (see columns (9) and (10) of Table 7 and (1) -(6) of (for DK) indicating that an increase in SSE-based employment in a given county substantially increases the employment in neighbouring counties through spatially induced effects (channel C).
Estimates from the Model 2 (see columns (7) and (8) In turn, estimates from the Model 4 indicate (see columns (9) and (10) of Table 7 and (1) -(6) of *** Table 9 here*** Lastly, we estimate the Model 6 enhanced with full set of spatially lagged explanatory variables (see columns (11) and (12) of Table 7 and (7) -(12) of (11) and (12) of Table 7 and (7) -(12) of Table 9 Rebonato and Jackel (2000) .
To sum-up, our results indicate that employment in SSE has substantial positive effect on employment outside the SSE. This effect is not restricted to the SSE hosting county, as assumed by channel B, but spills over to neighbouring counties in accordance with spatially induced effects of channel C. Non-spatial panel data approach which by assumption eliminates effects of this type, strongly underestimates the true impact of SSE on employment (that's probably why our evaluation of SSEs effect on employment is more optimistic than in most other studies on SEZs). By contrast, reverse inductions or feedback loop effects of channel D are negligible. As far as investments are concerned the results show that SSE attract new capital to hosting counties (lack of crowding out effects) but does not crowd in investments outside the SSE, neither in hosting county nor in neighbouring counties.
There are at least two possible complementary explanations of the results, both requiring careful examination, which goes beyond the scope of this paper.
Firstly, SSE-based companies may induce employee commutations from nearby areas (e.g. hosting and neighbouring counties) thus spurring employment outside direct vicinity of SSE territory with insignificant impact on investment. Furthermore, foreign owned companies, which dominate among SSE-based firms, offer their workers relatively high earnings. This constitutes additional purchasing power which is spent and thereby spur employment outside SSEs, in particular in services, which are labour intensive, but do not require large investments.
Secondly, substantial positive effect of employment in SSEs on employment outside the SSEs and no effect of investments in SSEs on investments outside the SSEs could be explained by FDI dominance in the SSEs. Foreign-owned companies and domestic firms in Poland are not neck and neck competitors. The former ones (even those, which operate in low and medium-low technology industries) are generally more technologically advanced than the latter ones. Thus, they do not really compete (nor cooperate) with each other. In fact, foreign owned companies are often strongly integrated within international value chains. As a result, they might not require supplies from local companies and local markets are not necessarily their target markets. If this explanation was correct, then the positive effect of SSEs on employment and investments could falter with domestic firms climbing closer to technological frontier. The more similar the firms in and outside SSEs 23 power which is spent and thereby spur employment outside SSEs, in particular in services, which are labour intensive, but do not require large investments.
Secondly, substantial positive effect of employment in SSEs on employment outside the SSEs and no effect of investments in SSEs on investments outside the SSEs could be explained by FDI dominance in the SSEs. Foreign-owned companies and domestic firms in Poland are not neck and neck competitors. The former ones (even those, which operate in low and medium-low technology industries) are generally more technologically advanced than the latter ones. Thus, they do not really compete (nor cooperate) with each other. In fact, foreign owned companies are often strongly integrated within international value chains. As a result, they might not require supplies from local companies and local markets are not necessarily their target markets. If this explanation was correct, then the positive effect of SSEs on employment and investments could falter with domestic firms climbing closer to technological frontier. The more similar the firms in and outside SSEs respectively, the larger the risk of SSEs causing serious distortions and thus, of crowding out effects. In this context, it is worth recalling that some studies for advanced economies identified faltering of benefits from SEZs in the long term (see, e.g. Gobillion, 2012) . Hence, our more positive estimates of effect of SEZs on employment and investment than ones obtained in most other studies (cf. Section 2) may not stem only from the fact that we consider spatially induced effects that other studies ignore, but result also from the development gap between Poland that we do analyse, and advanced economies analysed in other studies.
Regardless of which of the above interpretations is appropriate, existence of positive spatially induced effects, even if present only on the labour market, call for the debate on if and how costs of
SSEs' creation and functioning should be shared across local governments of SSEs hosting and non-hosting counties. However, designing a scheme for such a cost sharing would be extremely hard: possible faltering of benefits from SSEs would simultaneously change distribution of benefits between counties, which in turn imply a need for adjustment of a cost sharing scheme. Possible non-linearity in effects of SSEs of different characteristics (another issue for future research) may complicate that task further.
Robustness analysis
In this section we check the robustness of the results on various changes in modelling approach. For the sake of brevity we present FE estimates only, since the results do not differ substantially when DK estimator is used.
In part I of the analysis (see Table 10 columns (1) and (3) 18 ) we check how estimates change when counties belonging to consecutive voivodeships are excluded from the sample. It allows to examine if the results are not driven by above-average impact of SSEs in particular area of the country. We analyse only non-spatial Models 1 and 2 as the spatial dependence structure is disturbed by exclusion of particular voivodeships. The estimates remain highly significant and their dispersion around the full-sample case is reasonably low. Having said that, estimates obtained with the exclusion of Lodzkie voivodeship are lower from the full-sample estimates, which suggest that the point estimate of coefficients for the entire sample should be treated with caution.
Next, in part II we restrict the sample to counties which hosted SSE in any of the analysed years. If counties characterised by lower initial level of economic development were generally more likely to be chosen as SSE locations, than the catching-up process of these regions could inflate the observed impact of SSE designation on regional economic performance. The same problem would arise if general investment attractiveness of counties (not controlled for by the set of explanatory variables) was positively correlated with likelihood of obtaining SSE designation. We also cross-check the analysis with the approach described in part I i.e. exclusion of entire voivodeships from the sample
19
. The results (Table 10 , columns (2) and (4)) demonstrate that possible problem of endogeneity related to self-selection of counties for SSE designation is not an important issue in our analysis. It is worth stressing that this type of robustness check is not possible with dummy variable approach.
*** Table 10 here*** Subsequently, in part III we check if changing explanatory variable in Model 5 from total SSEbased employment (emp_sse it ) to the number of newly created jobs in SSE-based companies 18 We present only point estimates and t-statistics of for Models 1 and 2. Remaining estimates are available upon request. 19 As in part I we analyse only Models 1 and 2.
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(emp_sse_new it ) 20 affects the obtained results. This approach controls for the situation in which some of the already functioning companies have been included into SSE so their impact on hosting and neighbouring counties cannot be considered incremental. The significance of direct and indirect impact estimates 21 remains virtually unchanged as compared to the estimates obtained for the baseline specification. The only notable difference is that the direct impact estimate of SSE newly created jobs appear somewhat stronger than the effects pertaining to total SSE-based employment. *** Table 11 here*** Next, in part IV we check if the results are not driven by local governments spending. If SSE designation in a particular county coincides with more generous public expenditure on e.g. active labour market policies or infrastructure it may create spurious correlation between activity of SSEbased companies and employment or capital outlays outside SSE. We control for this effect by broadening the set of explanatory variables to include local government social and investment expenditure per capita (social_exp it , invest_exp it ) in Models 5 and 6, respectively. The results (Table 12  22 ) seem unaltered by these changes, though estimates of direct and indirect impact for added variables prove significant. Table 12 here*** Finally, in part V, to evaluate robustness of the estimated spatial effects to the assumed spatial dependence structure we run Model 5 and 6 with the use of different weight matrices (Table 13) .
We construct three alternative weight matrices:
 Centroids distance 60 km: inverse distance matrix based on geographic distance between centroids of every pair of counties with a cut-off distance of 60 km beyond which weights are assumed to be zero; 20 Companies investing in the SSEs are required to declare the number of jobs they intend to retain and create after obtaining SSE designation. These numbers are reported and controlled to determine if a given company qualifies for SSE-based benefits. 21 Estimates of remaining parameters are available upon request. 22 We analyse only Model 5 and 6 and restrict presentation of the results to direct, indirect ant total impact estimates. Estimates of other models as well as of remaining parameters from Model 5 and 6 are available upon request.
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 Capitals time 60m and Capitals time 90m: inverse distance matrix based on time needed to get by car from one counties' capital to another, according to Google Maps
23
; cut-off distance beyond which weights are assumed to be zero is set at 60 and 90 minutes respectively.
The results for both employment and investments model seem unaffected to the changes of the weight matrix: direct and indirect impact estimates and their significance is comparable to the ones from the baseline specification.
*** Table 13 here***
In conclusion, the results are robust not only to the choice of different estimators (as shown in the previous section), but also to exclusions of some of the counties from the sample (part I and II), changes in the set of explanatory variables (parts III and IV) as well as alternative specifications of weight matrix (part V). Relatively small deviations are present in the robustness analysis, but they do not change our main conclusions.
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In conclusion, the results are robust not only to the choice of different estimators (as shown in the previous section), but also to exclusions of some of the counties from the sample (part I and II), changes in the set of explanatory variables (parts III and IV) as well as alternative specifications of weight matrix (part V). Relatively small deviations are present in the robustness analysis, but they do not change our main conclusions. 23 We used Google Distance Matrix API and the data has been gathered on 30th of January 2015.
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Conclusions
We find that SSEs have substantial positive effect on employment. Employment in a given SSE create employment of almost similar scale outside the SSE in hosting county and almost twice as large in neighbouring counties. Effect of SSEs on investments is weaker, but still positive.
Investments in a given SSE do not crowd in investments outside the SSE, but do not crowd them out either. Hence, investments in SSEs add one to one to capital stock in hosting counties.
Our findings are more optimistic than ones obtained in most other studies on SEZs. This difference may stem from the fact that we take into account spatially induced effects that other studies on the topic ignore. However, other explanations are also possible and require thorough examination. We leave it for future research along with the issues of faltering of benefits from SSEs in the long run, possible nonlinearity in effects of SSEs of different characteristics, design of fiscal cost sharing scheme, just to mention a few.
Our results are robust to changes in estimation methods, sample composition, set of explanatory variables and spatial weight matrix. That said, they should be considered with some caution -at the very least due to estimation issues typical for panels with a short time dimension. Table1. Maximum financial aid in SSEs.
Figures and tables
Period Maximum financial aid in SSEs
1995 -2000 Total exemption from PIT and/or CIT of income earned during half the time of SSE existence (in principle during 10 years from the company start of operations in the zone), 50% exemption from PIT and/or CIT in the remainder of operations in the zone.
-2003
The tax exemption limited to the maximum aid intensity cap set out for each region separately. The maximum aid caps are expressed as percentages of costs related to investment or employment (qualified costs) generated by the company in the zone.
-2006
Increase of SSE available territory for large companies. From 1 May 2004 the maximum aid intensity caps were set at:  30% in the territory of Warsaw and Poznań  40% in the territory of Gdynia, Gdansk, Sopot, Krakow and Wroclaw  50% in the rest of Poland.
-2013
The maximum aid intensity caps changed to: 
(8) 
(8) Table 7 . Estimation results. Panel and spatial panel models of county-level employment and investment.
Notes: The estimated models are Models 1 to 6 presented in section 5. Variables definitions are reported in Table 5 . Presented regressions were carried out using fixed effects (FE) and Driscoll -Kraay (DK) estimators. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics in case of non-spatial models (Model 1 and 2) and z-statistics for SDM models (Models 3, 4, 5 and 6). Numbers in parentheses for SDM vs. SEM and SDM vs. non-spatial model tests are p-values for respective test statistics (the tests are presented in Section 5). Stars denote coefficient estimates significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) levels. 
(8) Notes to Tables 8 and 9 : The estimated models are Models 3 to 6 presented in section 5. Variables definitions are reported in Table 5 . Presented regressions were carried out using fixed effects (FE) and Driscoll-Kraay (DK) estimators. Direct, indirect and total impact definitions are given in section 5. Z-statistics for coefficient estimates are given in parentheses. Stars denote estimates significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) levels. 
(8)
1.738*** 
1.092*** Table 10 . Robustness analysis part I and II. Models 1 and 2 estimated using limited sample. Notes: Table 10 reports coefficient estimates for emp_sse and cap_sse. The estimated models are Models 1 and 2 presented in section 5. Variables definitions are reported in Table 5 . Presented regressions were carried out using fixed effects (FE) estimator. Columns (1) and (3) present results for the sample including SSE-hosting and non-hosting counties, while columns (2) and (4) present results for a sample including only the SSE-hosting counties (in which a SSEdesignated company operated in at least one year). Subsequent rows present estimation results obtained by including counties belonging to all voivodships in the sample or excluding from the sample counties belonging to a given voivodship. t-statistics for coefficient estimates are given in parentheses. Stars denote estimates significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) levels. Table 11 . Robustness analysis part III. Models 3 and 5 with emp_sse replaced with emp_sse_new.
Notes: The estimated models are Models 3 and 5 presented in section 5. Variables definitions are reported in Table 5 . Presented regressions were carried out using fixed effects (FE) estimator. Direct, indirect and total impact definitions are given in section 5. Z-statistics for coefficient estimates are given in parentheses. Numbers in parentheses for SDM vs. SEM and SDM vs. non-spatial model tests are p-values for respective test statistics. Stars denote coefficient estimates significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) levels. Table 13 . Robustness analysis part V. Models 5 and 6 estimated with alternative spatial weight matrices.
Notes: Table 10 reports coefficient estimates for emp_sse and cap_sse. The estimated models are Models 5 and 6 presented in section 5. Variables definitions are reported in Table 5 . Presented regressions were carried out using fixed effects (FE) estimator. Z-statistics for coefficient estimates are given in parentheses. Direct, indirect and total impact definitions are given in section 5. Stars denote coefficient estimates significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) levels 
